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part 1 briefly recounts the influence of social unrest 
and the explosion of knowledge in both psychology and 
the humanities circa 1970-1990. As the sciences rely on 
explicit top-down theories connected to bottom-up maps 
and models, and whereas the humanities build on 
bottom-up differences within malleable top-down “theo-
ries” (approaches, themes, theses, programs, methods, etc.), 
the changes in the sciences during this period contrasted 
sharply with the changes in the humanities. Part 2 discusses 
in detail how these two social transformations affected the 
histories of music theory and cognitive music theory. The 
former fractiously withdrew from its parent organization 
(AMS), whereas the latter was welcomed into SMPC. 
Inasmuch as both music theory and cognitive music theory 
rely on maps and models, Part 3 examines the metatheo-
retical importance of these terms for music cognition, 
music theory, and cognitive music theory. Part 4 speculates 
about the future—how music cognition, cognitive music 
theory, and music theory contribute to the structure of 
musical knowledge. The intellectual potential of this 
unique triadic collaboration is discussed: psychology pro-
vides a commanding empirical framework of the human 
mind, while music theory and cognitive music theory logi-
cally model moment-to-moment temporal emotions and 
the auditory intellections at the core of musical art.
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On the occasion of Tirovolas and Levitin’s research survey of Music Perception from 1983 to 2010 (this issue), it seems appropriate to recount the 
historical, cultural, and philosophical contexts that shaped 
the rise of music cognition and cognitive music theory in 
the United States. I begin shortly after the Vietnam War. 
Following the social divisiveness of the war (when many, 
including the present author, were in graduate school), 
radical changes occurred in almost every corner of mod-
ern life (e.g., the women’s movement, civil rights, jurispru-
dence, post-colonialism, etc.). 
A competing transformation in the 1970s was the 
growth of new knowledge and the establishment of new 
fields, which expanded the size of university faculties. 
During this development, college and university faculties 
became more professionalized. For those wanting to 
teach at the college level, doctorate degrees were the new 
reality, and to earn tenure, publication at many universi-
ties and colleges became mandatory. All this created 
pressure for more venues of publication. The emergence 
of music cognition (and its flagship journal Music 
Perception) was an outcome of all this (to which I shall 
return). 
Recent Ph.D.’s may regard my selected time frame as 
ancient history (occurring well before they were born). 
But both young and old should not forget the power that 
music exhibited during that turmoil, for it became a fa-
vored medium of rebellion and protest (e.g., “We Shall 
Overcome” during the civil rights movement and Bob 
Dylan’s “Blowin’ in the Wind” during political protests). 
Throughout this period, music showed its power by 
uniting people who had similar moral, political, and eco-
nomic values and who were against the war, against cur-
rent authority, and in favor of radically rebuilding the 
worldwide social structure. More so than any of the 
other arts, music created a sense of solidarity. It achieved 
this partly because mass culture via the simultaneous 
emergence of wide-reaching modes of electronic com-
munication (AM/FM radio, satellite television, video 
tapes, LPs, multi-track recordings, etc.) efficiently deliv-
ered music for like-minded consumerists, regardless of 
geographical location. 
The burgeoning multiplicity of types of listeners rep-
resented every economic, racial, gendered, and cultural 
level of society, including, of course, those who favored 
the war. Society saw a rapid rise of counter-cultural 
diversity in the proliferation of pop, folk, jazz, rock, 
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gospel, country-western, and ethnic music, something 
that is still with us today. Yet there remained, of course, 
a commitment to the institutionalized traditions of sym-
phony, chamber music, opera, ballet, and the Broadway 
musical.  
In higher education a consequence of targeted-listener 
demography was that both psychology and academic 
departments of music began to acknowledge music as a 
cultural, social, economic, and emotional force to be 
reckoned with. In other words, a social and academic 
revolution also took place regarding the way music was 
conceptually valorized. All music—whether “low” or 
“high”—was now worthy of collegiate study along with 
the European classical music of the past. 
With the war draft and the burst of new ideas, the 
number of undergraduate and graduate students want-
ing higher degrees increased. And a new kind of student, 
unschooled in classical musical traditions and interested 
mostly in the music of his or her social demographic, 
began to arrive on campus. Thus, shifts in the musical 
curriculum became inevitable. As diversity was now val-
ued, the study of popular culture, cultural history, eth-
nography, and music anthropology came to populate the 
course lists of universities and colleges across the coun-
try. At the forefront of this change stood postmodern-
ism, offering new methods for conceptualizing culture, 
identifying new subjects and areas for music research, 
and generally transforming how music was to be under-
stood. From the new wave of students, those who quali-
fied for the doctorate entered the professoriate and 
permanently changed the face of music study. 
Postmodernism
After the war, the wave of radical anti-authoritarianism 
in the humanities morphed into what emerged in the 
1960s in the vernacular juxtapositions of postmodern-
ist art. The critique of the modern versus the postmod-
ern was carried forward by the rise of literary theory in 
the 1970s and then applied to epistemology by a pro-
lific group of French philosophers in the late 1980s 
(Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault, Deleuze, Baudrillard, and 
others). 
Today, in some quarters scholars would say that we 
have now moved past postmodernism to an anti-post-
modernism environment. Indeed, in the mid to late 
1990s humanistic scholarship began to shift closer to the 
social sciences—to cultural history, cultural anthropol-
ogy, political theory, and the like. Other humanists dur-
ing this period retrenched to the writing of traditional 
history, but with an increased sensitivity toward the mul-
tiplicity of voices within a given culture and a correlated 
reluctance to think in terms of theoretical generaliza-
tions. 
Because the postmodern movement had an important 
impact on the interpretation of knowledge not only in 
the humanities but also in the sciences (to be explained), 
we must discuss it briefly and sketch out a few of its at-
tributes inasmuch as, even after a fairly short reign 
(roughly one generation), the residue of this ideology 
lingers on, permeating many current beliefs and prac-
tices in both fields. In what follows below, I will list some 
of the core beliefs and propositions. 
Postmodernism’s modus operandi was reflexive and 
hermeneutic. It attempted to construct and deconstruct 
written narratives (discourses, dialectics) about reality 
rather than to settle for the reality derived from empiri-
cal research. In its most conservative, purest form, it 
embraced interpretation while suppressing the analysis 
of facts, and favored personal understanding while hold-
ing general explanation suspect—this because reduc-
tionism marginalized difference, an important issue to 
postmodernists. 
Psychologists would regard the term postmodernism as 
a “fuzzy” category of general-knowledge (GK) (Medin 
& Barsalou, 1987) with multiple, sometimes contradic-
tory, strands. Defining the term is thus out of the ques-
tion. As an ideology without boundaries, postmodernism 
therefore does not proscribe how postmodernists go 
about their research programs. Some scholars adopted 
postmodernism in a pragmatic, fluid, and nuanced way. 
Others have been less flexible, even dogmatic and doc-
trinaire, claiming, for example, that “all, or nearly all, 
aspects of human psychology are completely socially 
determined” (see Duignan’s overview, 2011). In other 
words, to this latter group, behavioral science was just 
one narrative among many in the “game of language” 
(see Patton’s overview, 2001). 
Although these statements may seem absurd to the 
readers of this journal, the postmodernist’s philosophy 
was respect and tolerance—for the irreducible, for sig-
nifying, non-dialectical differentiation, for local varia-
tion, and for heterogeneously incommensurate values 
(the literature on postmodernism is immense; for gen-
eral overviews, the reader may consult Duignan, 2011; 
McGowan, 2005; Patton, 2001; for uses of the word in 
musicology, see Williams, 2000, and the numerous essays 
in Lochhead & Auner, 2002). Validity of experience per 
se could thus be trusted (though without “foundational” 
status), provided postmodernist scholars demonstrated 
self-awareness in their research by confessing their “situ-
atedness” (and thus potential bias) with respect to a cho-
sen text, dialectic, narrative, or what have you. Hence, 
unlike the sciences, postmodernist writings are full of 
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biographical asides and personal introspection. Such 
egoism is perhaps not surprising, given the movement’s 
focus on difference.
The postmodernist emphasis on deconstructing writ-
ten discourse confronted not just the semantic 
self-reference of written language but also the multi-
variate contexts of signifying images, icons, and other 
non-verbal imaginative phenomena (e.g., music and 
dance). They insisted that in language, word meanings 
functioned as parts of other word meanings in an infi-
nitely reflexive regression (or in a bracketed arbitrari-
ness). No words were concrete; all required interpretation. 
But within a given historical moment this enabled 
research to furnish a more or less accurate knowledge, 
one that was pragmatically useful if only of limited truth. 
(For today’s humanists, the test for knowledge produc-
tion is how well any approach, theme, thesis, program, 
method, etc., accurately and interpretively elucidates a 
chosen social discourse. This is notably different from 
the sciences where theories attempt mathematically or 
logically to model or map natural phenomena.)  
Postmodernists were suspicious of any kind of cen-
trism, essentialism, elitism, or high-level metatheory that 
suppressed nonconformist thought. Ironically, in its hey-
day postmodernism itself became the kind of grand 
metanarrative that it disparaged. That is, for all its pro-
testations against past ideologies, postmodernism be-
came just one more ideology among many, and in many 
cases was just as domineering and conservative as, say, 
the eighteenth-century Enlightenment or German 
Idealism (Kant, Hegel) that it vilified. 
In any event, like all humanists, postmodernists ele-
vated the notion of qualification to the nth degree. 
Intellectually, the movement institutionalized a kind of 
existential skepticism toward any kind of ideology (but 
too rarely skeptical of its own ideology). Its adherents 
claimed that all knowledge (including that gleaned from 
scientific techniques) was relative and historicized be-
cause human agents always construct knowledge in com-
pliance with current social practices and beliefs, which 
change over time. (Relative though knowledge may be, 
it cannot be gainsaid that both civilization and biological 
survivability strongly argue that human beings have for 
a very long time known quite a lot about the world, 
though not the elitist knowledge derived from scholarly 
pursuits.) 
 The interpretive vocabulary of postmodernism was 
replete with adjectives such as ideological, perspectival, 
situated, immanent, privileged, problematized, provi-
sional, phenomenological, subjective, approximate, con-
textualized, intertextualized, imbricated, mutable, 
speculative, qualifiable, and contingent. Postmodernist 
scholarly discourse placed a high value on heterogeneous 
and multiply textured interpretations along with a keen 
interest in the power relations that bolstered a given cul-
tural ideology. 
Many postmodernists were wary of interpretations 
that relied on scientific vocabularies—words such as 
axioms, constants, unity, generalities, equivalence, cyclic-
ity, veridicality, laws, rules, universals, reductionism, 
causation, prediction, probability, objectivity, indepen-
dent reality, certainty (binding implication), verified and 
falsified evidence, logical formalism, determinism, closed 
systems, foundational or holistic knowledge, truth, 
quantifiability, normative behavior, and the like. Instead, 
postmodernist “perspectivism” insisted that knowledge 
was necessarily a social construct (Kuhn, 1962) and that 
scientific reality was never totally objective (Gieryn, 
1999). (But again, to find out what science is about, 
physical and biological facts, however conceived, have to 
be part of the cultural discourse within the languages of 
mathematics and symbolic logic.)  
In sum, postmodernism was the academic discipline 
that made the case for idiostructuration—for difference 
and oneness (undefined by comparison to contextual 
similarity), for personal and group individuality, and for 
the value of sheer uniqueness. This is its legacy, although 
like all ideologies it overreached (particularly in its anti-
science posturing). 
The Decline of Humanistic Positivism
During the 70s and 80s, postmodernists largely brushed 
aside older disciplines in musicology, such as archival 
and manuscript research, primary source studies, and 
any kind of data collecting for its own sake inasmuch as 
isolated facts were suspect. According to them, the 
methodology of such philological practices was driven 
by a “positivist” mentality (a charge leveled by Kerman, 
1985). 
Over several generations, however, these so-called 
positivists had rediscovered and deciphered early music 
and then transcribed it into modern and reliable schol-
arly and performing editions. In so doing, they had be-
queathed a lasting legacy not just to the field but to the 
art of early music. But by concentrating on the verifica-
tion and falsification of source facts, postmodernists 
denigrated positivistic methodologies because they were, 
so it was said, theoretically impoverished, overlooking 
the relativistic and cultural nature of humanistic knowl-
edge. As we have seen, texts engendered multiple inter-
pretations, and notated scores were no different. 
According to postmodernist sensibility, the “closed” 
research of positivism rarely came to grips with the 
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culturally “open,” social meaning of the music. The 
charge was that the methods of scholarly positivism 
would never be capable of dealing with the true nature 
of musicological subject matter because text and authen-
ticity were contradictory concepts. 
Postmodernists also regarded stand-alone score anal-
ysis as just another form of positivism, which called for 
new kinds of historical and cultural approaches to music 
theory. But those committed to theory and analysis were 
unconvinced of postmodernist doctrine, and most held 
their ground. This decision had, as we shall see, a sig-
nificant outcome in music theory and analysis. 
Literary Theory and Postmodern Musicology
Eschewing the disciplines and methodologies estab-
lished by music positivism, the “new musicology” had 
to find new rules of scholarly behavior and, in general, 
looked to literary criticism and cultural theory for its 
models. If positivists and postmodernists shared any 
common ground, it was that both believed in musical 
styles as languages and scores as texts. So literary theory 
appeared to be an appropriate model for what was 
called the “new musicology.” 
Theory in the humanities means any kind of more or 
less fixed and hypothetically identifiable top-down ap-
proach to a text or a score, where the target of the literary 
or musical analysis is mapped onto the phenomenon in 
accordance with the chosen approach. The difference 
between the sciences and the humanities is obviously 
that in the latter there are no replicated experimental 
tests of the various hypothetical approaches. This is be-
cause the subject matter of arts and letters is unique, and 
so humanists respect the bottom-up, idiostructural qual-
ity of written phenomena (whether text or score) even 
if the internal analytical mapping violates the external 
top-down approach (i.e., transgresses the boundary of 
the selected “theory”). 
Hence, in the humanities, “anomalous” analytical 
uniqueness is frequently valued more than the general 
integrity and consistency of the approach because indi-
viduality is regarded as essential to the meaning of the 
humanistic phenomenon being analyzed. Humanistic 
theory is thus not paradigmatic because analytical map-
pings are always shifting the top-down grounds prese-
lected to generate the analysis (sometimes the grounds 
are ignored altogether in favor of the originality of the 
work or of the intellectual promise of an atypical map-
ping). In other words, the analysis need not be isomor-
phic to the chosen approach (to the “theory”). 
Free-wheeling analyses without explicit theoretical com-
mitments are thus not unusual in the humanities (e.g., 
in essays and journalistic pieces). 
The positivistic literary criticism of the 1930s and 40s 
was on the wane in the 1950s, and by the 1960s literary 
theory was in the ascendant. From 1960 onward one wit-
nessed endless turnovers in literary theory—from criti-
cal theory and literary history to semiotics, narratology, 
Marxism (commodification), structuralism, reactive de-
construction, psychoanalytical approaches (Freudian, 
Lacanian), myth criticism, phenomenology, existential-
ism, hermeneutics, reader-response theory (which had 
a psychological component), feminist criticism, black 
aesthetics, neo-Marxism, and leftist politics (Leitch, 
1988). 
Cycling through all the various approaches was re-
markable (many monists adopted one approach for their 
entire career). As said, these approaches are, from a sci-
entific point of view, not theories but mappings or mod-
els without explicit goals of theoretical unity. This is not 
to say there is no attempt at theoretical codification—
narratology, which comes from structuralism, is a very 
well developed literary theory (see Prince’s 1967/2003 
dictionary), as is semiotics (musical semiotics has clear 
mappings and an analytical symbology to go with them; 
see, e.g., Nattiez, 1990). Because the literary terrain is so 
varied and complex, one frequently must use many maps 
to arrive at a critical explanation of a given text, whether 
a poem or a score, inasmuch as textual meaning always 
remains culturally and historically contingent. 
The important point is that throughout the 1970s, 80s, 
and 90s these “theories,” themes, motifs, programs of 
research, approaches, mappings, models, and what have 
you were imported and freely appliquéd onto the post-
modern studies of music history and culture.
To respond to these new ways of thinking, a rush of 
new publications occurred in the arts and letters (e.g., 
New Literary History, 1970; Critical Inquiry, 1977), and 
this was no less true in musicology (e.g., Journal of 
Musicology, 1981). As elsewhere, various fields in music 
were carved up into subfields with specialized interests 
(e.g., 19th Century Music, 1977; Computer Music Journal, 
1977; Black Music Research Journal, 1980; American 
Music, 1983). 
As time wore on, the structuralism that typified earlier 
literary and music criticism thus yielded to the post-
structuralism of certain postmodernists. Many new sub-
jects found a place in the curriculum, and conflicts 
between “old” and “new” ways culminated in what came 
to be called the “cultural wars” (positivism vs. postmod-
ernism). These disagreements paralleled the “linguistics 
wars” (the polarization between transformational gram-
mars and transformational semantics; see Harris, 1993) 
and the “science wars” (postmodernist tenets vs. the na-
ture of science; see Gieryn, 1999). All three conflicts 
dominated the humanities, the social sciences, and the 
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sciences even into the late 1990s. Although tempers have 
cooled, the scars are still present. The question is, was all 
the polemic necessary? 
Science and Psychology 
If postmodernism foregrounded human difference per 
se, then human science in the form of psychology takes 
precisely the opposite tack, by seeking out the com-
monality and cross-cultural universals between indi-
vidually different social groups—between novices and 
sophisticates, savants and normals, and so forth. 
In science, change is motivated by a belief in incremen-
tal progress abetted by the unending analysis of experi-
mental data. Top-down theories are strongly integrated 
with their bottom-up models and mappings, and these 
require the latter to stay within the confines laid down by 
the theory. The lingering anti-authoritarianism in the hu-
manities and the strong desire to reject the received wis-
dom (which seemed unwise to many) was thus not nearly 
so pronounced in the sciences, which as an intellectual 
domain, has traditionally been less impacted by social 
change than the humanities or the social sciences. This is 
because normal science relies on “paradigms,” where 
change results from accumulated anomalies that eventu-
ally topple or suddenly dethrone a current theory (Kuhn, 
1962), relegating a once accepted practice to the status of 
an historical artifact. Such shifts perhaps depend less on 
social revolutions, which are motivated by metaphysical 
beliefs, than on confronting an accumulation of unsup-
portable data. So postmodernism had a limited effect on 
the “hard” sciences (physics, chemistry, mathematics). 
However, it invaded the “soft” social sciences (cultural 
anthropology, sociology, political science, and econom-
ics) and social psychology. This is because the bottom-up 
mappings and models used in the soft social sciences are 
less tied to their theoretical structures, which is to say, in 
the soft social sciences a lot of modeling and mapping 
takes place without obedience to explicitly or implicitly 
fixed theories. So what happened in the “soft” social sci-
ences roughly paralleled what went on in the humanities; 
hence, postmodernism—following the social upheaval 
after the Vietnam War—played a greater role in these 
disciplines. In contrast, the “hard” social sciences more 
closely resembled the “hard” sciences and so remained 
somewhat immune from postmodernism (space does 
not permit examples from the social sciences). 
Also less affected were “hard” psychological research 
areas (psychophysics, perception, cognition, memory, 
development, attention, etc.) since these experimental 
fields are data driven and paradigmatic in their approach. 
Thus in general the methodological rigor of the “hard” 
sciences was influenced more by the growth of new 
knowledge and new technologies than by the social 
unrest. 
As said, in the 60s and 70s scientific knowledge was 
expanding at an exponential pace, and, as new subfields 
emerged, there was a large increase in the number of 
research articles being written (as in the humanities). 
Consequently, traditional journals, whose editors were 
conservative and committed to the past, were over-
whelmed, and scholarly societies felt strong pressure to 
provide more venues for publication. This was partially 
solved by subdividing journals into topics (e.g., in 1970 
Physical Review was broken into nuclear physics, parti-
cles and fields, general physics, and solid states; Journal 
of Experimental Psychology [1916] was split into animal 
behavior [1976], general [1976], human learning and 
memory [1976], human perception and performance 
[1976], learning, memory, and cognition [1982], and ap-
plied [1996]). Of course, many new journals were 
founded as well (e.g., Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 1981; Cognitive Neuropsychology, 1984; 
Theory and Psychology, 1991). Other solutions for in-
creasing the “bandwidth” were to publish more issues 
per year and to opt for a two-column, larger page with 
smaller type. 
New publications also appeared in the hard sciences, 
where novel kinds of interdisciplinary research (e.g., ge-
netics) required new interdisciplinary publications (e.g., 
Molecular Biology and Evolution, 1983; Methods in 
Organic Synthesis, 1984). Parallel developments in psy-
chology saw the advent of information processing (and 
later informatics), artificial intelligence, personal com-
puters, the high-tech fields of cognitive science, and 
eventually cognitive neuroscience. 
Music Cognition
As in the humanities, there was some irritation by music 
psychologists that psychology as a whole had prioritized 
the studies of language and vision and largely ignored 
the topic of music (which to some extent is still the case 
today). It was into this milieu that Diana Deutsch 
launched the interdisciplinary journal Music Perception 
in 1982. But as we saw, the establishment of a new jour-
nal was not unusual at the time. Psychomusicology, whose 
founders included scholars from both music and psy-
chology departments, appeared in 1981, one year before 
Music Perception, and the British journal Psychology of 
Music, which had a strong bent toward educational psy-
chology, had existed since 1973. The point is, a critical 
mass of psychologists collectively yearned to push music 
cognition into prominence. 
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The argument behind this thrust was that that study 
of music opens a window onto psychological processing 
like no other art form. Music is primarily a temporal art, 
with inherently mathematical properties of time and 
space (intervallic and durational ratios; pitch height, re-
gistral direction, return of pitch frequencies; meters on 
many levels, etc.). Yet perceptual experiences swirl con-
stantly, like the blades of a windmill (see Figure 1). 
Theories of music cognition bring this windmill into 
focus, providing a shuttered lens that models the whole 
gamut of the temporal human experience, from psy-
chophysical stimuli to mapping our deepest emotions. 
Such musical snapshots of this experiential temporal 
swirl have the potential to fan outward, informing every 
aspect of psychological processing. This is the impor-
tance—and the challenge—of our field. 
It was clear from the beginning that Music Perception 
was to be an international journal, and Deutsch worked 
hard to include European and Asian scientists (in the East 
the chief participants have been the Japanese, the Koreans, 
and the Australians). But the unusual philosophy of Music 
Perception was its commitment to interdisciplinary re-
search. The very earliest issues made this clear, where ar-
ticles by music theorists (Benjamin, Brown, Bruner, 
Butler, Erickson, Narmour, Lerdahl, Lewin, Thomson, 
Walsh, and others) and linguists (Chen, Jackendoff, Keiler, 
Steedman, and others) appeared alongside those by psy-
chologists. In addition, Deutsch’s acceptance of interdis-
ciplinarity encouraged psychologists and music theorists 
to collaborate, and over the years many such co-authored 
articles have appeared (e.g., by Butler and Ward, Eitan 
and Timmers, Krumhansl and Lerdahl, Narmour and 
Rosner, Meyer and Rosner, Parncutt and Bregman, Repp 
and London and Keller, and others). Music theorists also 
began to publish their own experiments in the journal. 
Music Perception was thus always meant to be a mixture 
of theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of 
music (I will discuss the importance of music theory to 
the interdiscipline later). 
The use of the word “perception” in the title of the 
journal made the point that, even though cognition was 
then the dominant approach, the areas of perception, 
psychophysics, and acoustics were not to be left behind. 
In other words, Deutsch was something of a maverick 
with respect to the cognitive revolution (Cognition was 
first published in 1972). Yet from the beginning the ar-
ticles in the journal cast a wide net—from biology to 
bells to art to medicine and beyond, even as cognition 
swept over the field of psychology from the 1960s on-
ward—following the rejection of positivist Skinnerian 
behaviorism and the codification and incorporation of 
Gestalt principles into the mainstream. 
When Deutsch stepped down as editor in 1995, the high 
quality of the journal continued unabated under the lead-
ership of Jamshed Bharucha (1995-98), Robert Gjerdingen 
(1998-2002), and Lola Cuddy (2002 to the present). 
Particularly noteworthy in the past fifteen years or so has 
been the broadening of subject matter to include research 
in the perception of musical time, musical emotion, and 
musical performance along with, perhaps, an increase in 
use of patterned and contextualized musical stimuli which 
are thought to be more “ecologically valid” (see Figure 2 
in Tirovolas & Levitin, 2011). And in 2005 under Cuddy’s 
supervision, the journal underwent a complete makeover 
in format with double columns and more issues per year 
to accommodate the growing rate of submissions. In the 
world of science publications Music Perception has thus 
achieved more visibility than ever before. 
The prophetic music books on psychology in the 1950s, 
60s, and 70s—for example, those of Meyer (1956; for a 
recent scholarly appreciation of Meyer, see the entire first 
issue of Musica Humana, 2009), Francès (1958/1988), 
Fraisse (1956), Roederer, (1973), Plomp (1976), Davies 
(1978), Critchley & Henson (1977), and Pierce (1983)—
begged for a collection of expert essays summarizing the 
latest research, which Deutsch’s (1982) path-breaking vol-
ume more than met (a second, new volume with fresh 
articles followed in 1999; a third is in preparation). 
After 1982, a cascade of edited volumes of scholarly 
essays flooded the market (see Table 1). Numerous text-
books augmented these scholarly essays at the under-


























FIGURE 1. The shuttered lens behind the windmill (see text).
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1986; Hargreaves, 1986; Sloboda, 1985, and others). 
During the same period, a number of music-theoretic 
books specifically directed toward music psychology 
shaped the field (e.g., Gjerdingen, 1988; Lerdahl & 
Jackendoff, 1983; Narmour, 1990, 1992; Parncutt, 1989). 
Solo books by scientists were also a regular and impor-
tant occurrence (e.g., Krumhansl, 1990; Serafine, 1988; 
Sundberg, 1987). Diana Deutsch formed SMPC in 1990, 
and the first meeting was held in 1992 (at the second 
ICMPC). By then music psychology had clearly become 
an independent research area and had achieved status as 
an interdisciplinary subject throughout the academic 
world. 
Much more could be said about the many scholars 
who contributed to its rise, but I need not recount that 
history because it has been dealt with elsewhere (see 
Cohen, 2009; Cross, 1998; Gjerdingen, 2002; Hallam, 
Cross, & Thaut, 2009; Huron, 1999,  and many 
others). 
By the mid-1980s music theorists had gained access to 
the voluminous amount of empirical work being done 
in music psychology. Musicians could now efficiently 
examine the discipline’s methodologies and experimen-
tal designs along with glimpsing into the specialized 
bibliographies of psychophysics, perception, cognition, 
development, attention, and memory. Music theorists 
also became aware of comparative psychology in areas 
such as language, vision, and animal behavior. And not 
a moment too soon: for looming just around the corner 
was the juggernaut of cognitive neuroscience, which 
would eventually take a strong interest in music. 
Part 2 
Music Theory as an Independent Discipline
Although tonal systems (learned pitch hierarchies) have 
dominated pitched music for thousands of years (and 
continue to typify what most people listen to), twentieth-
century audiences had to confront many new systems 
of composing that suspended, avoided, weakened, or 
suppressed tonality altogether. There were many rea-
sons for this revolution, rejection, whatever one wishes 
to call it. In twentieth-century music (whose early in-
novators were Debussy, Schoenberg, Bartók, and 
Stravinsky), it appears that these composers were rebel-
ling against the tonal authoritarianism of high roman-
ticism, whose musical ideas seemed to be depleted. In a 
political sense, we might historically interpret the com-
positional desire to overthrow the past—to reject tonal 
knowledge as stylistically “played out”—as a musical 
protest against the capitalist societies that produced the 
carnage of the late nineteenth century, which fulmi-
nated into World Wars 1 and 2. As we saw earlier, wars 
cause cultural changes in the arts because to some ex-
tent the arts model the culture to which they belong. 
However, the more direct reason for the rejection of 
romantic tonality, up to the tonal minimalism of the 
1960s, was to free composers from the stylistic con-
straints that tonality imposed and from the entrenched 
musical traditions that seemed to ignore the momentous 
changes taking place in twentieth-century society; 
namely, the onslaught of modernism, the hegemony of 
scientific reasoning, and the growing wonders (and mu-
sical possibilities) of technological innovation. 
Following nineteenth-century egoism—that it was 
genius and originality that guaranteed historical 
greatness—composers of the early twentieth century, 
who boldly accepted the new social status quo of 
modernist society—thus sought to formulate new 
musical identities. If great scientists possessed the in-
novative creativity to discover new and unanticipated 
natural laws, why couldn’t both modern and post-
modern composers invent new systems of music? 
Given the number of great tonal composers from the 
past—whose works were preserved and had domi-
nated concert programming for 150 years—the prob-
lem for contemporary composers was crafting an 
individualized musical voice, finding new audiences 
for that voice, and becoming a new great—one who 
invents original and compelling music. Thus, like lit-
erature and the visual arts, “serious” music radically 
cycled through styles decade by decade (see Morgan, 
1992) since every composer wanted to be recognized 
and remembered as an innovator. 
Traditional tonal theory and analysis were at a com-
plete loss to cope adequately with the blitz of new mod-
ernist styles in the twentieth century, such as non-serial 
atonality, twelve-tone atonality, integral serialism, ex-
perimentalism, indeterminacy, pluralism, minimalism, 
electronic music, computer music, and so forth. 
TABLE 1. Chronological Listing of Edited Essay Volumes Published 
During the Rapid Rise of Music Cognition as an Independent Discipline.
Deutsch, (1982)
Bruhn, Oeter, & Roesing (1985)
Howell, Cross, & West (1985)
Gabrielssohn (1987)
Sloboda (1988)
McAdams & Deliège (1989)
Howell, West, & Cross (1991)
Jones & Holleran (1992)
McAdams & Bigand (1993)
Aiello (1994)
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Accordingly, beginning with the early revolutionary 
works of Debussy, Ives, Scriabin, Stravinsky, and 
Schoenberg, and continuing through the Futurism of the 
1910s (Russolo), the neoclassicism of the 20s (Poulenc 
et al.), the experimentalism of the 30s and 40s (Cowell, 
Cage), the integral serialism of the 50s (Babbitt and 
many others), and the minimalism of the 60s (Reich and 
many others), new theories had to be constructed and 
formulated to unravel these never before imagined mu-
sical “languages.” And such theories had to be created 
whole cloth because these newly asserted, highly original 
styles seemed largely without precedent. That is, unlike 
past changes in tonal styles, these new languages did not 
gradually evolve, and so exhibited musical content that 
was either very high in information or else heard just as 
noise. Although much of the new music was directed 
toward connoisseurs, increasing numbers of new styles 
were imposed on ordinary listeners who found modern 
and postmodern music either very demanding, confus-
ing, or altogether unintelligible. 
Consequently, composers played a very important part 
in constructing the theories of this new music. Given 
that music theory had always been shaped by composers, 
it was not surprising that many modern composers were 
likewise involved in formulating music theory (e.g., 
Schoenberg, Hindemith, Stravinsky, Krenek, Sessions, 
Babbitt, Rochberg, Perle, Stockhausen, Boulez, and many 
others). Thus composers were directly responsible for 
much of the new thinking in music theory. 
They even had their own journal, Perspectives of New 
Music (established at Princeton University in 1962), which 
complemented the Journal of Music Theory (established at 
Yale University in 1957). The significance of these publica-
tions in shaping the future of music theory as an indepen-
dent discipline cannot be overestimated (the scholarly 
problem for this Princeton-Yale axis at the beginning was 
that the field was so small “insider” peer review was com-
mon). Together, the two journals defined the subjects, 
methods, techniques, and assertiveness of the field, a tone 
that probably derived from the myth of the misunder-
stood, alienated composer of romantic lore, which easily 
transferred to music theory: like positivistic musicologists, 
music theorists felt isolated and disdained by the American 
Musicological Society (AMS). 
With so much at stake, the theorists who took up the 
cause had to sort out the pitch collections, the synthetic 
scales, the non-tertian chords, the new kinds of textures, 
the complexes of additive and subtractive rhythms, the 
asymmetric meters, and the impact of all these on new 
types of formal arrangements, which seemed to be non-
organic and lacking the aesthetic tonal arches that listen-
ers were accustomed to. 
By the early 70s, music theory had constructed an 
array of new analytical techniques to determine the 
structures of these unprecedented works. Because these 
theories depended largely on internally consistent logics, 
they and the descriptive graphic analyses that they gener-
ated were different from anything previously seen in the 
history of music theory. 
Both traditional and “new” musicologists found these 
innovative descriptive theories and their graphic analy-
ses hard to fathom, and, moreover, too many of the 
analyses seemed overly technical and thus uniformed by 
historical and cultural knowledge (earlier tonal theories 
of music relied on roman-numeral analysis and key la-
beling, which can be learned by first-year undergradu-
ates). As appreciations, these analyses, many of which 
were intellectually interesting and analytically enlighten-
ing, attempted to validate the new styles through theory 
alone, with scant attention paid to the part history or 
culture played in such a judgment. 
Because the new theory had, it seemed, few precedents 
and marshaled new kinds of analytical methodologies 
and novel symbologies (e.g., derived from ideological 
commitments to Schenkerian theory, set theory, math-
ematical groups, arrays, combinatorics, and many other 
kinds of formalistic descriptions), the editors of tradi-
tional musicological journals were generally reluctant to 
publish the research articles using these techniques. 
Given the pressure to publish in academe, music theo-
rists found this frustrating. A correlated irritation was 
the perception that at national conferences of AMS they 
felt they were receiving less than their fair share of the 
allocated program slots for discussions of recent theory 
and innovative analysis. 
If the music historians were troubled by the new the-
ory, the new theorists felt that both the old and new mu-
sicology devoted too much time to taxonomies of style, 
manuscript attributions, social functions, cultural mean-
ings, and social histories with only rudimentary and 
unsophisticated attention to the “music itself,” to its 
structures, forms, materials, composition, and so forth. 
(Furthermore, the “new” musicology had been woefully 
negligent in studying the compositional content of “seri-
ous” twentieth-century music.) 
In short, those interested in analysis and theory and 
who were fascinated by contemporary composition were 
simply “disinterested in the kinds of activities AMS fos-
tered” (Forte, 2003, paragraph 5). Consequently, music 
theorists begin to plan seceding from their parent orga-
nization inasmuch as the “very idea of an autonomous 
‘field’ of music theory was anathema to many in the 
AMS” (Forte, paragraph 4). (It should be noted that 
Leonard Meyer, who began his career as a composer, was 
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against the split from the beginning because he thought 
that theory and analysis would be severely compromised 
in the absence of also studying the appropriate historical 
contexts.) 
In 1977, alienated theorists founded the Society of 
Music Theory (SMT), and in 1979 launched the society’s 
journal, Music Theory Spectrum (to complement the 
Journal of Music Theory, 1957, and the German journal 
Musiktheorie, 1979). The British journal Music Analysis 
followed in 1982, and France’s Analyse Musicale in 1985 
(Music Theory Online appeared in 1993). As in music 
psychology, for the first time a plethora of articles about 
twentieth-century music qua music saw print, and even 
the analysis of tonal music received a more thorough and 
rigorous treatment than ever before. Like music cogni-
tion, music theory seemed to be a discipline whose time 
had come. (For the chronology of SMT’s founding, see 
Browne, 1979.) 
But after the split, the bad feelings between AMS and 
SMT did not dissipate. Postmodern “liberals” took a dim 
view of “positivist” music theory which, as a stand-alone 
discipline, seemed to churn out pluralistic analytical 
“readings” and “feature” descriptions of music scores for 
their own sake. Aside from their technical complexity, 
such stand-alone analytical articles represented a textual, 
logical exegesis of complex musical works. “Ideas” 
(Schoenberg, 1950/2010), “imaginary concepts” (Goehr, 
2007), or “fictions” (Guck, 1994) were also explored, 
which implied the need for imaginative prose interpreta-
tions and elaborate analytic graphs to accompany the 
elitist musical experiences of the professional analyst. 
The postmodernist charge was that such analyses, 
however logical, lacked sufficient context (history, cul-
ture, society, aesthetics, and cognition) without promise 
of connecting to a “larger picture,” and relied too much 
on the authority of the printed score, where the music 
text was “freeze-framed.” In effect, the score was reduced 
to an objective, reified, autonomous thing (Butterfield, 
2002) with a determinable, closed structure. (Since the 
mid-1990s, many theorists have taken great pains to deal 
with these criticisms, and SMT is more open to criticism 
and much richer in diverse approaches than it was in the 
80s and 90s.) 
But at SMT’s inception, music theorists (and the com-
posers that backed the stand-alone analytical enterprise) 
were very protective of their turf. They insisted not only 
on their right to independence from AMS but also as-
serted the logical value of “analysis itself” in producing 
isolated analytical “readings” of works with little atten-
tion to communicative properties or meanings outside 
the analysis itself. Nevertheless, the attacks continued 
from the historians (e.g., Kerman, 1980, 1985; Treitler, 
1982) with replies in like kind from the theorists (see, 
e.g., Agawu, 1997, 2004). Music theorists felt under siege 
at the time (Schmalfeldt, 1998), and SMT hunkered 
down to preserve and defend itself against all postmod-
ernists, determined to show AMS members that sophis-
ticated analysis was necessary and that it would survive, 
flourish, and in time validate itself (for more bibliogra-
phy and examples of theory’s defense, readers should 
consult the first six essays in volume 3 of the 1997 Journal 
of Musicology). 
Music Theory versus Cognitive Music Theory
I relate this chronology because during the “circling of 
the wagons” in the 1980s, an important moment was 
missed. Many theorists interested in music cognition, 
empirical evidence, scientific method, formalized lin-
guistics, and so forth were also searching for publica-
tion outlets. But SMT, with its strong representation of 
composers, overlooked music psychology and did not 
encourage an interest in it. In the very first issue of 
Music Theory Spectrum the editor (Simms, 1979) wel-
comes “historical studies, contributions to pedagogy 
and reflections upon the discipline itself, analyses of a 
wide variety, refinements or innovation in analytic 
methods, and more speculative statements about musi-
cal logic, meaning, and effect.” But there is no hint of 
music cognition here. Even twenty years later, aware 
that music theory is regarded as “insular, elitist, and 
inbred,” a former president of SMT (McCreless, 1998) 
makes a case for reaching out to the “sister societies” 
(College Music Society, Society for Ethnomusicology, 
and AMS), but again, no mention of connecting to 
SMPC. 
As we have seen, unlike the situation in music theory, 
the study of music cognition involved opening up the 
field—studying listeners instead of the introspective 
analytical judgments of an academic elite. And cognitive 
music theorists were not so much interested in the score 
(the “text”) as in the perceptual processes and emotional 
experiences of ordinary listeners. The questions were,
what exactly does music communicate, and how does it 
do so in terms of cognitive processing? 
Implicit in music psychology was the skepticism to-
ward logical theories that were incapable of empirical 
testing. To cognitive music theorists, many analyses of 
the new theory had a rationalistic quality. In the year 
SMT was founded, I wrote that theorists “should attempt 
to formalize an implication-realization model within the 
context of certain psychological theories that bear di-
rectly on the problems of perception and structure” 
(Narmour, 1977, p. 212). Much later, others (Wiggins, 
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Müllensiefen, & Pearce, 2010) echoed this sentiment, 
saying that unless music theory is “explicitly informed 
by music cognition studies,” it will remain “a figment of 
the imagination,” a “kind of folk psychology” (p. 231; see 
also Cross, 1988). Of course, “where one draws the line 
between, say, fictional objects and set-theoretical struc-
tures may well depend on one’s metaphysical convic-
tions” (Frigg & Harman, 2009, section 2). 
Those in music cognition, who moved beyond the en-
circled perimeter of SMT, became outsiders overnight. 
Cognitive music theorists, however, felt little need to 
challenge either the postmodernist status quo of AMS 
or the positivistic status quo of music theory. With the 
open policy of Music Perception, and all the burgeoning 
publications preceding and following the establishment 
of the journal, they were welcomed into music cognition, 
which by this time was in full bloom (the Society for 
Music Perception and Cognition was established shortly 
thereafter). 
Now there are national organizations dedicated to 
music cognition in six countries—Korea, Japan, Australia, 
Europe, Argentina, Canada, and the U.S. (the SMPC 
website lists 49 labs dedicated to auditory perception and 
music cognition). ESCOM was formed in 1990, and its 
journal, Musicae Scientiae, came out in 1997. Today, in 
distinguished institutions in both the United States and 
Canada, there are faculty in music departments whose 
research lies mostly in music cognition. And, somewhat 
ironically, as of this writing, one of the largest study 
groups in SMT consists of theorists interested in music 
cognition. In sum, music cognition is here to stay. 
Table 2 summarizes the discussion thus far. Let me 
now, however, contrast a number of the differences be-
tween “outsider” cognitive approaches to music theory 
and the practices “inside” current music theory. We recall 
that Music Perception was to be an interdisciplinary jour-
nal (also emphasized by Mari Riess Jones in her 2004 
presidential address to SMPC); so it is important to list 
what the general disciplinary differences between cogni-
tive music theory and music theory are. 
Of course, no one is in complete agreement about 
what music theory is (see the variety of essays in Broman 
& Engebretsen, 2007). But it is clear that since its found-
ing, traditional music theory has remained focused on 
composers, composing, on specific compositions (criti-
cism), and on the styles and materials of music. Major 
concerns in this respect are a work’s “motivation,” its 
unique style of composition (parametric interactions, 
concatenation of techniques, etc.), and its multi-leveled 
structuring. But as discussed, a given analysis in tradi-
tional music theory is primarily introspective and phe-
nomenological and interposes the analytical “reading” 
between the listener and the hearing of the score. The 
goal of such analysis is thus to mediate, explain, and elu-
cidate the score for those who wish to purvey its meaning 
through the theorist’s personal experience, understand-
ing, description, and evaluation. 
These personal interpretations are to reveal the ana-
lyst’s “deeper sense” of the text in order to enhance oth-
ers’ appreciation of the work (Temperley, 1999). Such 
analytical practice is obviously conservative. A perfect 
example is Schenker’s view that only through his theory 
can people hear and understand the long-range coher-
ence of the great German works of tonal art (see 
Snarrenberg, 1997; Cook, 1990, regards Schenker’s view 
as just metaphoric). Modeled again after textual analysis 
in literature, such logical exegeses are typical of the com-
poser/score approach. 
Historically, pedagogy and “appreciations” have, of 
course, always been a central concern of music theory. 
In schools of music, analytical coursework has always 
attempted to explain how sophisticated music is written, 
how it is structured, and by extension how one can learn 
the grammatical rules to write convincing musical 
TABLE 2. Four Related Fields, Comparing What Each Doubts (= Rejects) and Trusts (= Embraces).
Fields: Music Cognition Cognitive 
Music Theory
Music  Theory Musicology
doubts mechanistic, “positivistic” 
Watsonian-Skinnerian 
behaviorism 
rationalistic music theory 




positivist critique of 






trusts the cognitive revolution,




ogy, perception and 




cal analysis, elitist score 
“readings,” and their 





& intellectual history, 
cultural studies, cultural 
anthropology
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TABLE 4. Some Generalized Differences Between the Two Fields.
Music Theory
(as a humanistic discipline)
Music Cognition
(as a scientific discipline)
main preoccupation: analysis of score main preoccupation: analysis of data
analysis: largely retrospective (retrodictive) and relativistic analysis: largely prospective (predictive) and reductionist
memory and attention are an afterthought memory and attention are always considered
deep structural knowledge of the musical repertory shallow structural knowledge of the musical repertory
modus operandi: logical, rationalistic, theory driven,  
introspective, personal connoisseurship
modus operandi: empirical, data driven; hypotheses must 
be replicable by others
metaphysical grounding: belief metaphysical grounding: behavior
chief mode of explanation: word chief mode of explanation: number
“forgeries” of a given style. Such “exegetical” analyses 
dominate theory textbooks at both the undergraduate 
and graduate levels. 
However, music theory was never just about improving 
theory pedagogy but rather about revealing the creativity 
of past masters to give musicians the analytical tools to 
study great works, to provide music criticism with a li-
brary of “close readings,” to explain a musical work’s unity 
(or at least its consistency), and to furnish culture with 
aesthetic rationales to valorize musical artworks. Even 
style studies by themselves were ultimately designed to 
function as prisms for elucidating individual artworks and 
illuminating the composer’s unique accomplishments. 
In contrast, cognitive theorists are fascinated with how 
experienced and inexperienced listeners prospectively 
perceive and comprehend music’s emotional affects and 
intellectual stimulations. In addition, they take a strong 
interest in explanations of common behavior and natu-
ral learning rather than in the individualized, denatural-
ized, exegetical analyses of music. Indeed, cognitive 
theorists claim that much of what current analysis ac-
cepts is not cognitively feasible, despite the degree of 
logic. That is, it goes against inborn processing systems 
that cannot be switched off. 
To explain: cognitive impingements exercise a tremen-
dous constraint on remembering long-term relationships, 
and much of what current analysis produces is 
problematic in terms of the limitations of both attention 
and working memory. Moreover, many analyses violate 
what is known about the psychological principles of 
grouping (chief among these are the far-fetched map-
pings of linear patterns in tonal music and the bracket-
ing (or encircling) of non-parametrically equivalent sets 
in the analysis of contemporary music). In short, the less 
cognitive, the more rationalistic, and the more personal 
analyses are, the more dependent their value is on the 
metaphysical beliefs of like-minded analysts. 
Tables 3–4 summarize some basic and generalized dif-
ferences between music theory and cognitive music 
theory. Table 5 shows some of the focal differences and 
similarities, Table 6 the different attitudes toward listen-
ing, and Table 7 some differences in outcomes. Although 
the dualistic descriptions in these tables are “essential 
half-truths” (after O’Brien, 1998), they are useful in 
sharpening our views about the different though inter-
related connections between the two fields. 
Given that the music theorist’s retrospective study of 
composition, the score, and the value of expert academic 
“readings” has historically and pedagogically been of 
obvious value, we might ask, how does music cognition 
deal with the topic of analytical criticism and the legacy 
of a great composer? How does it, in vouching for the 
experiences of ordinary listeners, account for the ex-
traordinary listening of great composers? The answer is 
TABLE 3. Some Basic Differences Between the Two Fields.
Music Theory
(as a humanistic discipline)
Music Cognition
(as a scientific discipline)
subject matter: how music is composed, structured, and 
functions as an art form
subject matter: how music exemplifies basic psychological 
processing
the score as a complex historical text containing multiple 
interpretations, some of which are purely imaginative
the score as a partial but variable formalization, a recipe, or 
a set of instructions 
focus is on composers and composing focus is on perception, cognition, and experimental design
ideas with experimental possibilities are of little or no concern emphasis on hypotheses that can be experimentally tested
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that a significant proportion of any composer’s musical 
processing is the same as that of the ordinary listener. To 
compose is simultaneously to listen and to perform in 
one’s head. When a motive, passage, or phrase is sketched, 
the composer constantly critiques the compositional 
decisions by reentering the creative domain of the per-
former and the cognitive constructions of the listener. 
Among their many motivations for writing music, 
great composers are first and foremost great listeners 
who gradually acquire deep psychological insights into 
producing human emotions and affects. They also cap-
ture the auditory human intellect with impressive sonic 
precision. This is what cognitive music theorists study, 
and it is a propitious way to take up the issues of analy-
sis and criticism as regards the perceptual—rather than 
the compositional—experience. 
Part 3
Theories, Maps, and Models: Analogical Thinking
Humanists and scientists employ four different strategies 
to map or model the world, depending on the circum-
stances that confront them: (1) through belief (e.g., a 
cultural ideology), (2) through logic (as in mathematics 
or other rigorously systematic thinking), (3) through em-
pirical evidence (as in duplicated, controlled experiences), 
or most commonly (4) through a varied invocation of all 
three modes simultaneously. Because humans are social 
creatures, all theories are in some nontrivial sense cultur-
ally conditioned. We cannot avoid having our beliefs 
creep into the creation of our knowledge (Poovey, 1998). 
This is why we have such trouble objectively evaluating 
TABLE 5. Focal Differences and Similarities.
Music Theory
(as a humanistic discipline)
Music Cognition
(as a scientific discipline)
high-level structure of central concern manifest structure of main concern 
details valorized as individualized properties of artworks and 
essential to the phenomenological experience of the analyst
experience modeled but with individualized details classi-
fied as outliers or anomalies; generalizing the aesthetic 
experience
generally more interested in aesthetics, ideas, imagination, “fic-
tions,” myths, and narrativity than in psychological emotions 
more interested in arousal, emotion, affect, feeling, mood, 
than in aesthetic philosophizing of any sort
TABLE 6. Attitudes Toward Listening.
Music Theory
(as a humanistic discipline)
Music Cognition
(as a scientific discipline)
listening assumption: professional or expert attention by a 
sophisticated academic elite
listening assumption: variable attention expected from a 
subject sample of ordinary listeners 
humanistic stance: existential, personal “reading”; auto-  
biographical stance; egoism analytically maximized
scientific stance: social, population response (contagion); 
sense of self minimized so as not to influence data
musical development of listening not an issue (analysis by 
and for a academic elite)
development a major issue (experts vs. novices; trained vs. 
untrained; old vs. young)
TABLE 7. Different Outcomes.
Music Theory
(as a humanistic discipline)
Music Cognition
(as a scientific discipline)
explanations: formal, phenomenological, heuristic, etc.; relying 
on technical, insider vocabularies
explanations: perceptual, cognitive, developmental, etc.; 
relying on technical, scientific vocabularies
interpretations: semantic, symbolic, representative, reductive interpretations: statistical, mathematical, graphic, numeri-
cally weighted
written work organized by approaches, theses, topics, and 
themes
written work organized by testable hypotheses and data 
analysis
published work: a humanistic form of literature, criticism, 
or essay; based largely on semantic and logical reasoning 
published work: a scientific form of literature; based largely 
on empirical argument and numerical data
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and choosing between alternative theories with more or 
less equal weight: inherent cultural relativity cannot be 
objectively falsified (Kuhn, 1962; Polanyi & Prosch, 1975). 
This means that facts are not pure; they are neither value-
free nor theory-free, and social processes are always impli-
cated in their discovery (or their theoretical invention). 
The relationship between experienced fact and em-
pirical observation is mediated by discursive interpre-
tation, and such interpretation, if it rises to the level 
of explanation, is itself mediated by theoretical con-
struction. Theory-building feeds off empiricism, and 
empirical analysis derives equal value from theory. 
The tension between theory and empirical data con-
stitutes the epistemological problem of knowledge. 
Sometimes this can be resolved by tweaking the logic 
of the theory or sometimes by gathering more (or dif-
ferent) empirical data. But a perfect solution is never 
possible.
Theory is a used and abused word with a thousand 
meanings, from the hazy mappings in the arts and 
humanities (theses, themes, approaches, programs, 
positivistic methods) to various kinds of partially 
representational models that provide a psychological 
perspective on reality (Giere, 1999) to the precise 
theories employed in the physical and mathematical 
sciences (very clear axioms, definitions, hierarchical 
propositions, etc.). Although many types of theory 
construction exist, the organization of most formal-
ized work is logically similar in its structure and in-
volves a common set of distinctions. 
As an example, consider the metatheoretical path cho-
sen to formulate the implication-realization model 
(Narmour, 1990, 1992). I began by: (1) listing my intui-
tive, contemplative, and introspective speculations about 
melody; (2) devising postulates, grounds, axioms, and 
hypotheses for the theory; (3) making clear definitions 
of abstract (theoretical) and concrete terms, properties, 
and attributes (those to which people will normally as-
sent); (4) writing a set of hierarchical statements (major 
and minor premises) in order to formulate (5) how the 
theory’s construction can be systematically operational 
in terms of a symbological system and (6) how the the-
ory is to be empirically evaluated in terms of principles, 
logical consistency, coherence, and parsimony. Of course, 
no matter how careful the initial protocol, such organi-
zation says nothing about the ultimate quality of the 
theory—(7) its ecological accuracy and scope and (8) its 
implicative consequences as regards revealing new 
knowledge and formulating new questions. 
Thus, we have  the  c lass ica l  a t t r ibutes  of 
theory-construction: conjecture, observation, terms and 
sentences, symbological goals, and allowance for em-
pirical testing. Only one thing is missing: analogy. 
In that connection, now consider the importance of 
modeling and mapping to theory-making (see Figure 2). 
Models and maps are highly defined research programs 
representing the theories to which they are attached 
(Frigg & Hartmann, 2009). Such theories can be logically 
or empirically driven (or both). Without models, theo-
ries lack the specificity to become operational with re-
spect to their targeted research goals. In an important 
sense a model or a map interprets—which is to say ex-
plains and fills in—the correlated theory’s formalized 
properties in terms of the phenomenological content 
that the theory is designed to explain. But the content of 
a model or a map is rarely identical or completely iso-
morphic to the abstract properties of the theory that 
comprises it. Yet it is not entirely independent either. 
Rather, the modeled or mapped content complements 
the theory. 
Models and maps are thus less complete and more 
tentative than theories. This is why I call the theory the 
“implication-realization model”: its target of study is 





























introspective (initiated from personal experience)
rationalistic (certain concepts are privileged)
phenomenological (certain observations asserted as
       mental objects, functioning as factual content in the theory)
pragmatic (designed to facilitate the theory)
empirical (if designed to be tested)
often symbological (rule-driven nexus)
implicative (pointing to “downstream” social practice)
MODELS or MAPS
FIGURE 2. A hypothesized tripartite conceptualization of research 
phenomena vis-à-vis the properties of theories and models or maps. 
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1996) that the theory has the potential to deal with all 
musical parameters in any style. But that remains to be 
modeled (or mapped). 
If theories are top-down, post-facto constructions for-
malizing the applications of their associated models and 
maps, then the latter constitute ongoing, incomplete, 
bottom-up analogues (Frigg & Hartmann, 2009)—research 
programs engaging the manifest, objective content that 
defines the ecological subject matter. In some sense, then, 
models and maps are always more connected to reality 
than theories are. Yet models and maps alone—without 
explicit connection to a theory—remain impoverished 
and incapable of moving to stage 8 (above). As we have 
seen, in both literary and musicological criticism, map-
pings can be employed with no attached theory whatever. 
But such mappings rarely coalesce into an operational 
theory by themselves (i.e., theoretical guidelines are always 
necessary). Likewise, theories without models or maps 
lose their ability to generate new knowledge and to pose 
new questions, no matter how rigorously logical or beau-
tifully constructed. 
Music theories descriptive of a stylistic domain often in-
volve logical sentences that have positivistic-like predicates 
reflecting the style—the “language” to which they apply—
but associated models and maps need not be linguistic in 
nature; that is, they may be neither semantic nor syntactic 
and yet adequately analogize or represent the targeted phe-
nomena of the research (Frigg & Hartman, 2009). 
The best theories are connected to maps and models 
via refined analytical symbologies (e.g., the importance 
of mathematics in the sciences). Indeed, analytical sym-
bologies form an epistemological nexus between theories 
and models by concretizing the analytical space that ex-
ists between the theory and its models (or its mappings). 
In the absence of symbolic analytical systems to bind 
them together, both theories and their models connect 
less strongly. Intellectual domains that use models and 
maps but lack integrated analytical symbologies thus 
tend to produce more tenuous research conclusions. 
Through concrete analytical symbols governed by clearly 
formulated rules, the power of a top-down theory is lib-
erated, and through concrete analytical symbols, 
bottom-up models and maps fill in the gaps of the theory 
with precise analogical content. 
The analytical symbols of the implication-realization 
model are syntactic because they attach directly to the 
score (whose relationships, we presume, exhibit cogni-
tively perceptible sequences). This means that the symbols 
are minimally reductive because, no matter how accurate 
the notation, a highly detailed score itself is already an 
idealized reduction of what the composer envisioned. (To 
be sure, the model is designed to generate higher reductive 
levels as well, but these lack the reality of the manifest 
surface of the music.) It is clear, then, that theories, maps, 
models, and analytical symbologies are not all of a type. 
Together they form complex intellectual creations that in 
some sense recapitulate epistemological history. 
By themselves, models and maps are part Aristotelian 
(or Lockean) in that one initiates their construction by 
trying to think from the ground up (item 1 earlier) by 
introspecting one’s own perceived experiences. They are 
part rationalistic in that they involve believing and priv-
ileging certain concepts (2 and 3). They are part phe-
nomenological in that certain observations are asserted 
as mental objects and thus function as the factual con-
tent of the theory (4). Their properties are logically em-
pirical when the theory is designed to be tested (5). They 
are pragmatic (6) in that items 1–5 are purposely de-
signed to be complementary and to allow theory, model, 
map, and symbology to work analogically, hand in hand. 
And finally, their ultimate value results from “down-
stream” social practice (7), causing those to whom the 
theory is addressed to conceive of the targeted phenom-
ena in new ways and to attend to relationships never 
before observed (8). In short, models and maps make the 
purpose of a constructed theory clear via its expressed 
ontology (nature), epistemology (conceptual basis), and 
formalized rule-driven methodology governing the use 
of its analytical symbology. 
Obviously, most of the ways society bandies about the 
word theory falls far short of items 1–6 (the best scientific 
and mathematical theories being exceptions). However, 
there is an important addendum: no ideal, perfect theory 
exists because theories have complex, multiple parts, not 
all of which the analogous models or mappings express. 
This is because initial introspective protocols of any 
theory may turn out to be badly mistaken; the original 
choice of grounds may be based on misleading meta-
phors or myths; early definitions may be false, inaccu-
rate, or incomplete or else require either additional or 
fewer distinctions (having been overspecified), and so 
forth. As the inevitable contingencies emerge, it becomes 
clear that certain theories are more useful than others, 
but only to the extent that they carry with them the seeds 
of their own improvement—generating anomalies and 
untenable facts that have to be taken into account in 
order to improve the theory (the unavoidable conclusion 
derived from the data as tested by the theory). 
Relationships between theory and data are symbiotic. 
Experimental work is the feedback system. Many empirical 
scientists, it would seem, rarely think about theory. But 
theory frames all data collecting, looms behind all data 
analysis, and ultimately determines the worth of all data 
interpretation. Statistics, after all, is based on theorems and 
theoretical laws regarding numbers. Those who use statis-
tics without knowing those theorems and laws do so at their 
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peril (e.g., multiple regressions can be misleading if the data 
lack homoscedasticity; see Rosner & Narmour, 1992). 
Nevertheless, theory is biasing — a pair of blinkers that 
can prevent one from seeing contradictions. To change the 
metaphor, a theory must be worn like a set of clothes (not 
taken by faith as a system of belief). A selected theory may 
be appropriate for certain circumstances but not for oth-
ers. Interpretively modeled empirical data tell theorists 
what concepts in the closet are suitable for analytical wear 
and which should be left on the hanger. 
Yet empirical evidence without theory is also biasing. 
What counts in explaining any natural phenomenon 
emerges from a point-by-point conversation (or narra-
tive) between theory, model, and analytical symbology, 
and this must involve not just the data that support the 
theory but also the anomalies that fly in the face of the 
analogues and thus contradict the theory, the model, the 
analytical symbology, or all of them together. 
Music Theory, Cognitive Music Theory, and Cognition
No reasoning is ever completely abstract because expe-
rience invades every thought. Likewise, not every expe-
rience is entirely relativistic. In the construction of 
theories, maps, models, and analytical systems, what 
matters depends on the degree of holistic coherence 
among the abstract, the empirical, and the relativistic. It 
follows that music theory as a logical humanistic disci-
pline and music cognition as a scientific empirical dis-
cipline are complementary. Each in its own way has 
weaknesses that can only be ameliorated by the strengths 
of the other. Table 8 summarizes this. The comparison 
shows how each discipline augments the other.  
To repeat, this is not to say that music theory and cog-
nitive music theory are not independent. There will al-
ways be areas of interest in music cognition that hold no 
interest for music theory, and vice versa (Krumhansl, 
1995). Working together need not compromise the 
authority of either field. 
If the humanities strive to understand the differences 
between putative sameness or similarity, and if the sci-
ences attempt to explain the commonalities between 
putative behavioral differences, then who deals with the 
chasm between these two diametrically opposed worlds? 
One answer is cognitive music theory, an interdiscipline 
that, at least potentially, can initiate and sustain dialogues 
between the two disciplines. Yet because both music 
theory and cognitive music theory are young fields, 
many practitioners do not seem to recognize their special 
calling in the scheme of knowledge production. 
As we see, then, the epistemological distance between 
humanistic mappings and scientific theories, and thus be-
tween music theory and cognitive psychology, is great 
(Clarke, 1989; Cross, 1988). Likewise, the explanatory space 
between musicology, ethnomusicology, music anthropol-
ogy, and moment to moment musical emotions is vast, and 
larger than ever. And this is where cognitive music theory 
steps to the fore. It can bridge the gap in all areas because 
cognitive music theorists bestride the two fields, one foot 
in psychology and the other in music theory. 
From one (modeled) perspective, cognitive music the-
ory functions as a delivery system through which normal 
music theory gets uploaded to psychology in an empiri-
cally testable package (as in the I-R model) or as a set of 
hypotheses needing to be tested (as in the rules of Lerdahl 
& Jackendoff’s 1983 model or in Gjerdingen’s 2007 schema 
theory of galant music). In its download mode, cognitive 
music theorists can identify what is psychologically rele-
vant, useful, and critical toward constructing, correcting, 
or refining a music theory. In addition, they can identify 
and channel psychological facts that are most relevant to 
music analysis and thereby ground music-theoretic ob-
servations in perceptual and cognitive reality. 
Many perceptual studies have shown how grouping 
principles determine everything from motivic salience 
to voice streaming (compound melody), and if those 
principles are violated, ordinary listeners will simply not 
hear the connections (Bregman, 1990). If, for example, 
TABLE 8. The Need for Interdisciplines.
Music Theory
(as a humanistic discipline)
Music Cognition
(as a scientific discipline)
flaw 1: intuitive, theory-based concepts and definitions may 
lack cognitive grounding, ignoring the perceptual reality of 
subject matter
flaw 1: knowledge structures and acquired data may be too 
abstract, irrelevant, or trivial to be of cognitive musical 
importance
flaw 2: analysis can be too subjective with problems of private, 
egoist content and unexplained multiplicity (too many events 
and tokens to be temporally perceived in a single object) 
flaw 2: selected data can be rationalistically objective with 
inadequate representation (events too few), ignoring the 
possibility of other minds and lacking in ecological validity
result: too many disconnected articles; too many specialized 
theories; insufficient attempts to formulate unified theories; 
output is cognitively implausible 
result: too many disconnected experiments; too many hy-
potheses; too many theories; too little generalizing about 
cognitive unity
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linear patterns lack cognitive reality and are forcibly 
mapped onto analytical reductions, they will be mislead-
ing regarding unity or coherence (as an example, see 
Morgan’s 1992 linear analysis of Webern’s fifth bagatelle, 
op. 9, which ignores known grouping principles). 
Grouping principles and the processing mechanisms of 
attention are inborn and cannot willy-nilly be switched 
off unless one adopts a kind of inattentional deafness to 
the music. Such denaturalized listening occurs when id-
iosyncratic, exegetical, expert, elitist analyses disregard 
what is known about the perceptual and cognitive prin-
ciples that govern music. That said, the importance of 
music cognition to music analysis does not deny music 
theory’s autonomy as a scholarly field inasmuch as gen-
eralized psychological explanations lie very distant from 
the multidimensional cultural, sociological, political, 
aesthetic, and historical concerns of score-centered 
music study (as illustrated later in Figure 3). 
To take another example, consider the relationship 
between structure and memory. Most music analyses are 
structuralist-oriented and move hierarchically from 
manifest levels to higher-level reductions, or vice versa 
(most often generated from a top-down grammar of 
some sort). Such structural reductions tend to be cor-
related with formal junctures, cadences, and keys—the 
assumption being that these “structural points” are what 
sophisticated music listeners store in long-term memory 
to enable the recognition, the rehearing, or the process-
ing of other works with similar stylistic sequences. 
However, there is convincing evidence to show that 
listeners also remember emotional peaks and emotional 
endings (see Rozin, Rozin, & Goldberg, 2004). What this 
means in terms of memory is that any theory that deals 
with only the structural aspects of a work provides only 
half an analysis, ignoring altogether the remembered af-
fective structuring. In order to capture both the remem-
bered structure and the remembered affect of a musical 
work, analysts need to construct a simultaneously run-
ning analysis of both, showing how syntactical structure 
and affective structure complement, reinforce, and 
deform each other. 
Part 4
The Potential of Cognition and Music Theory in 
Understanding the Arts
In the Old Schools quadrangle of the Bodleian Library at 
Oxford University, the upper stones on each side bear 
inscriptions of the medieval quadrivium (namely, 
mathematics [or arithmetic], astronomy, geometry, and 
music) and the trivium (grammar, logic [dialectica or 
debate], and rhetoric). These stones tell us that in the 
early 1600s music was still regarded as part of mathemat-
ical science as defined by the Pythagoreans (proportion, 
measurement, interval, ratio, degree of consonance, and 
structure of the universe, i.e., the musical harmony of the 
spheres). Of course, we do not think of music this way 
now (the textualists would say that music is a form of 
rhetoric). Nonetheless, it is inspiring to think that music 
study once occupied a lofty scientific position, as op-
posed to today where music is regarded solely as an art. 
But as I will explain, music study should occupy an ex-
alted position in the humanities and in psychology. 
In modern universities there is a new trivium in place: 
the humanities, the social sciences, and the sciences (see 
Figure 3). Encircling this is the postmodern quadrivium, 
where religion (belief systems, faith systems, ideologies) 
and philosophy (metaphysical interpretation) arch over 
the humanities on one side, and where mathematics and 
psychology envelop the physical sciences on the other (re-
call that the sciences are cultural constructs and thus 
partly psychological). By philosophy I mean the discipline 
that arbitrates metaphysical interpretations, disputes, and 
explanations in and between all fields. Mathematics in 
Figure 3 includes not only the ordinary definitions of the 
subject but also formalized logical systems of all kinds that 
map more or less perfectly onto experience. 
The disposition of religion needs more explanation. 
By it I do not mean just organized religion as practiced 
by its believers, but religion as a system of propositional, 
metaphysical, structured, and operational beliefs apart 
from its social, political, anthropological, and economic 
manifestations. There is no question that all research 
concepts, whether scientific or humanistic, entail a com-
plex system of structured propositions. In this broad 
sense, we may even regard ideologies as a kind of secular 
religion (agnosticism, mysticism, and myth also charac-
terize belief systems). 
Because human knowledge will always remain incom-
plete, we will never rid ourselves of metaphysics, reli-
gions, faith systems, beliefs, and ideologies, and because 
of that, we must scrutinize practices concerning such 
propositions for whatever biases they marshal against 
the acquisition of logical and empirical knowledge 
(hence their position in the outer ring of Figure 3 as 
serious subjects of study). Belief systems arise on every 
level because all natural and social phenomena are inher-
ently resistant to a complete and detailed logical or em-
pirical mapping or modeling. Because knowledge is a 
social construct, as postmodernism has taught us, em-
pirical work is thus always associated with belief(s) and 
propositional system(s). The use of the words mapping 
or modeling reminds us of the limitations of logical and 
empirical theories vis-à-vis whatever proportion of 
propositional belief that such metaphors entail. 
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Psychology lies at an outer ring of the new quadrivium 
because all written knowledge, whether scientific or hu-
manistic, is a product of the human mind. Lying below are 
the rest of the humanities, the sciences, and the social sci-
ences, the latter of which are partially humanistic (e.g., case 
studies, political history) and partially scientific (demogra-
phy, economics). Below this ring we find the professional 
schools. Diagrams such as this, of course, are simply an-
other example of constructive thinking that enables us to 
understand what is, after all, one of the most complex social 
entities ever conceived—the modern research university. 
The general organization of Figure 3 is thus not de-
finitive or deterministic but rather suggestive and imag-
inative. The nested circles, which are purely organizational 
and not closed, are meant to be read across different 
angles of radii and evaluated in terms of nested circum-
ferences. That is, any one subject can radiate throughout 
the diagram but can also travel around any given circle 
(e.g., language). These circles thus do not contain their 
subject matter because, as we all know, the modern 
university is a vast heterarchy, where interdisciplinary 
cross-cutting and networking are the norm. 
The figure’s visual rhetoric is purposely meant to pay 
homage to those iconographical medieval drawings of 
circles within circles, which tied human activities to the 
cosmological scheme of things, except here, of course, 
my cartography attempts to emphasize the radiating cor-

































































































































































































































FIGURE 3. A hypothesized, nested, circular arrangement of intellectual domains of study at research universities (see text for interpretation).
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At the center of the wheel are “human interests,” the usual 
elements without which human life is not conceivable (shel-
ter, food, water, clothing, craft, play, art). In any civilized so-
ciety these human concerns radiate outward and evolve into 
areas of study, education, and research. Figure 3 shows these 
as spokes, which articulate areas of study as we move from 
the mundane center toward the outer rings. 
The geometrically progressive spoke, which expands 
outward, is where craft, play, and art (at the edge of the 
core) recruit each of our sensorial systems, developing 
and channeling them into the various aesthetic produc-
tions (and ultimately into games and sports). All these 
become academic areas in the modern university. As a 
form of adult play, observe that the performing arts meld 
into one ongoing progression from dance to ice-skating 
to gymnastics to competitive sports (at many institu-
tions, athletics is also studied as a business). Notice also 
that language per se is a dominant activity (having its 
own spoke; note that writing sits astride, as most of the 
world’s people are illiterate).
In the intellectual scheme of Figure 3 music might 
seem to be a minor activity (note its small size relative 
to language). However, as we have seen, music and the 
arts lie at the very core of what it means to be human 
inasmuch as they model our life experiences and make 
us more emotionally fit (Dissanayake, 1988) to live 
meaningfully. Indeed, all the arts are not peripheral but 
core activities radiating outward to the upper circles. 
Note that music history sits not at the core, where music 
theory resides, but higher up, in ring three above the 
applied schools (hence the huge space between musicol-
ogy and the study of musical emotions at the core).  
As we see, in this projection, psychology and mathe-
matics operate at a magisterial level, informing all human 
thought. Along with religion and philosophy, they co-
reign over the academic enterprise. Yet neither the outer 
ring nor the core dominates the circle. Rather, the areas 
in-between—all those subjects encompassed by the 
modern trivium—bind the core to the quadrivium, as 
gravity binds the universe. 
The academic world is psychology’s oyster because it 
spans from neurobiology to sociology and has, since its be-
ginning, purveyed the sciences, the social sciences, the hu-
manities, and the arts in all their manifestations.There is no 
part of Figure 3 that psychology has not studied, influenced, 
informed, and interpreted. After all, everything humans do 
is, in some profound sense, psychological, and that includes 
all the core intellectual and artistic activities that engage us. 
Such envelopment could hardly be otherwise because the 
scholarly and research worlds that we create are psycho-
logical human constructs. Psychology thus impinges on 
every aspect of human life and on all human knowledge-
seeking (how could it be otherwise?). 
Although still a young field, psychology is thus not just 
another science. Its purview over all human activities 
(and thus all academic disciplines) is pervasive, and con-
sequently it belongs at the outer ring, along with math-
ematics, religion (of which it was once a part), and 
philosophy (of which it was also once a part).
In contrast, music is essentially a moment to moment 
core experience. To the engaged listener it is processed 
on the manifest level—the level of emotion, affect, 
arousal, mood, feeling, sentiment, and unanticipated 
intellectual insights into the temporal domain. Music 
theory deals with these moments by attempting to un-
derstand music’s materials, functions, structures, and 
stylistic and artistic musical instantiations. 
But as a core experience (near the basic elements nec-
essary to life), there is a large gap between music theory 
and the psychology of emotion—a gap, however, as we 
have seen, that can be effectively bridged by cognitive 
music theory. 
Figure 4 illustrates this. The point here is that in con-
necting music theory to psychology via cognitive music 
theory, psychology releases music theory’s potential by 
grounding it as an intellectual discipline and by directing 
music upward to the postmodern quadrivium (the outer 
circle). As recompense, music theory repays the favor by 
affording psychology genuine, ecological musical con-
tent with which to experiment. Both psychology and 
music theory are dependent on cognitive music theory 
in order to draw a complete map of, or to model, the 
musical experience. Hence music cognition shows how 
psychology can imaginatively and advantageously unite 
with music theory, and vice versa. 
Because of the numerical nature of music (scales, in-
tervals, ratios, meter, etc.) and because music already has 
an elaborate and sophisticated symbology, music theory 
and cognitive music theory can model how the other arts 
and letters might connect to cognition. What is needed 
are more cognitive theorists of literature, cognitive theo-
rists of the fine arts, cognitive theorists of film, and cog-
nitive theorists of dance. In the long run the whole 
research enterprise of the humanities cannot be divorced 
from psychology. The humanities need grounding in 
cognition no less than music theory. Furthermore, the 
need is mutual: psychology needs enrichment from the 
experiences that model moment by moment human 
emotions at the core. 
As psychology continues to mature, to consolidate its 
research programs, and to unify its theories, and as neu-
roscience reveals more and more about how our brains 
work, both sciences will come to rely more on learning 
what the content of music, literature, and the arts is, 
without which psychological laws and brain research will 
remain general in nature, lacking the real-world of 
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human emotion and concrete human intellect. As stated 
earlier, this does not mean that the humanities or the arts 
will become reduced to what is known only in psychol-
ogy or neuroscience. 
What I am arguing here is a permanent link between 
the artistic core and the outer ring without the subjuga-
tion of one to the other. In other words, I am saying that 
music as an academic subject must reclaim its former lofty 
status held from Pythagorean times to the high Renaissance 
by reconnecting to the science of psychology. Music theory 
and cognitive music theory have the potential to bridge 
the ontological span that separates them from musicology, 
ethnomusicology, and music anthropology. 
What are called for are new programs for interdisciplin-
ary Ph.D.’s and more appointments of interdisciplinary 
faculty. Theory in the arts and letters is too sophisticated 
for psychologists to dabble in, just as the field of psychol-
ogy is too complex for faculty in arts and letters to play at. 
Music Perception, Musicae Scientiae, SMPC, and ESCOM 
have blazed the way in this regard and can serve as a model 
for the future of interdisciplinary education, provided 
cognitive music theorists continue to contribute to this 
journal as theorists (rather than just as experimentalists) 
and provided they remain essential to the public discourse 
of cognitive psychology. 
Current work in cognitive music psychology has 
taught us much about the specialized psychological pro-
cesses that are unique to music and also about the gen-
eralized processes that music recruits and utilizes from 
other cognitive domains (such as language). What we 
should not overlook, however, is the unique potential of 
collaborative scientific work in music to uncover previ-
ously unknown foundational principles in psychology. 
That music psychology has the potential to lead music 
theory and cognitive music theory to new insights is in-
disputable. This can best be realized if music cognition, 
music theory, and cognitive music theory work together 
toward creating unified theories.
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FIGURE 4. The gap between the mundane world with its musical core 
(as studied in music theory) and the elevated and remote level of psy-
chology (as mediated by cognitive music theory).
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